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Notes:
Standing, Still? The Evolution of
the Doctrine of Standing in the
American and Israeli Judiciaries:

A Comparative Perspective
ABSTRACT

The doctrine of standingplays an important role in limiting
the classes of cases or controversies that are appropriate for

judicial resolution;considered with other justiciabilitydoctrines,
judicial standing necessarily reflects the broader role of the court
in society. Though the American judiciary had rathergenerous

standing policies in place at the time of the founding, with the
rise of the administrativestate in the aftermath of the New Deal,
progressive justices saw fit to restrict judicial standing as a
means of insulating regulatory programs from industry

challenge. In contradistinction,the young Israelisociety has some
of the most accessible courts in the world; the doctrine of standing

poses no meaningful limitation on access to a judicial forum and
the nonexistence of standing is a reflection of the role the Israeli
society expects its courts to play in calling the government to
account for its actions. This Note provides a historicalaccount of

the evolution of the American doctrine of standing, followed by
an account of the Israeli doctrine of standing. Highlighting the
key distinctions between the judiciariesof the United States and
Israel, this Note identifies the challenge posed to the legitimacy
of the Israelijudiciary should it continue permitting unfettered

access to judicial forums with
limitations.

no meaningful standing
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I. INTRODUCTION

Courts serve as a meeting place for all factions of society. In
formalized democracies, meaningful access to a legislative forum is
often predicated on influence, power, wealth, and connections. In this
quid pro quo world, those lacking power and influence may be left in
the cold, naturally funneling their aggravations to the judicial process.
Because courts often have lower barriers to entry than legislatures,

they frequently serve as the site of the most pointed interactions
amongst government, the citizenry, social movements, political groups,
business entities, and others. Access to a judicial forum sometimes has
a formal bar to entry,1 but the typical predicate question to forum
access is whether the proposed plaintiff has suffered a legal wrong that
2
can be resolved by the exercise of judicial power. And depending on
3
the level of generality used to determine the scope of rights, the
4
breadth of constitutional obligations, and the self-perceived role of the
court vis-a-vis other facets of government, access to the judicial forum
may be granted.
Views on the role of courts are as wide and varied as the questions
posed above, and the limits of judicial authority are enforced in no
small part through doctrines of justiciability, including standing. The
doctrine of standing is the overarching boundary of judicial authorityit demands a litigant fulfill its requirements as a prerequisite to forum

See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of
1.
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) ("The Supreme Court
has described standing as a 'sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to
obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."').
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (requiring
2.
three elements to satisfy the standing doctrine: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation by
defendant; and (3) the ability of the court to provide redress).
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 150-53 n.4 (1938)
3.
("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten Amendments.").
4.
Id.
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entry.5 In the United States, this controversy first played out in
Marbury v. Madison, the case in which the Supreme Court defined its

jurisdiction and set forth the core premise from which American
jurisprudence has since sprung. 6 In that case, the Supreme Court
limited its own authority in accordance with Article III of the U.S.
Constitution and interpreted its role as the stringent enforcer of
boundaries between the three branches of American government.7
Building on this original decision, the judge-made doctrine of standing
has developed to restrict entire classes of cases, including those claims
based on statutory grievances granted by Congress but that in practice
lack the concreteness of injury required by current judicial
interpretation to satisfy the case or controversy requirement. 8
During the ratification debates around the U.S. Constitution,
political theorist and philosopher Alexander Hamilton argued for a
powerful national judiciary with the authority of judicial review when

he said that "the courts were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature . .. to keep the latter within the
limits assigned to their authority." 9 To Hamilton and many other
founders who experienced the heavy handedness of unchecked
executive power, a court empowered to enforce structural limitations
on government exercises of authority was of vital importance.1 0 In
other words, Hamilton understood the purpose of the judiciary to be a
lubricating power for democracy, empowered to prevent the
aggrandizement of power unto the executive or legislature thereby
safeguarding liberty." He viewed the Supreme Court as the arbiter of
constitutional complaints, the institution tasked with resolving
conflicts between political subdivisions, and the vindicator of rights not
necessarily beloved by an impassioned majority.12

5.
See F. Andrew Hessick, UnderstandingStanding, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
195, 196 (2015) (discussing standing as an affirmative limit on the exercise of judicial
power).

6.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (determining that access to
federal courts is to be limited to the specific cases or controversies permitted explicitly
or implicitly in Article III).
7.
Id.
8.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992) (denying
plaintiff standing based solely on a citizen suit provision because the injury asserted was
speculative and lacked the imminence required by the constitutional limitation on acce ss
to the federal judicial forum). But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 498-99 (2007)
(allowing states special solicitude as quasi- soverigns to sue even if a private plaintiff in
the same position would be precluded by the doctrine of standing).
9.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (Andrew Hacker ed.,
1976).
10.
See id. at 143 (describing the importance of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution's structural limitations on exercise of power not specifically within the
jurisdiction of each branch of government).
11.
See id.
12.
See id. at 145.
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Practically, courts serve as mediators between the people and
government actors.1 3 But a predicate inquiry to accessing a judicial

forum is whether the case at bar is justiciable in accordance with the
limitations imposed on courts by external constitutional or statutory
constraints, or by jurisprudential limitations on the exercise of judicial
power.1 4 The inquiry of justiciability asks whether courts are the
5
appropriate forum for the settlement of a controversy.1 The doctrines
of ripeness, mootness, and standing are all wrapped up in this inquiry,
which has been interpreted to contain various limitations describing
the circumstances under which the discharge of judicial power is
appropriate.1 6 These limitations on the exercise of judicial power differ
from society to society; in the rules of justiciability, there is no "one size
fits all" approach.17
The American story of justiciability has not been static over the
course of history. The doctrines that set forth the limitations on court
access have ebbed and flowed throughout many distinct moments of
American legal history, depending on the era-specific needs of the
society and the necessary and proper role for the court in a particular
8
political or legal moment.1 Some commentators and theorists point to
Article III of the U.S. Constitution as the foundation of the doctrine of
standing,1 9 while others point to Anglo-American history and tradition
to explain the ascendance of the doctrine. In Israeli society, the High
Court of Justice has never had a constitutional constraint on the
exercise of judicial power. From the time of its birth, Israel's founders
expected courts to act forcefully and powerfully to contribute common
law rulings to the mishmash body of law that prevailed in the nascent
state.2 0

See id. ("[C]ourts were designed to be an intermediate body between the
13.
people and the legislature.").
For example, the doctrine of standing, mootness, and other justiciability
14.
questions precede access to a judicial forum. These doctrines are affirmative reflections
of the position a court holds in a society, and are rooted in constitutional and
jurisprudential limitations on the exercise of judicial power. See Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphorof Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 137273 (1988) (discussing the results of a world without standing requirements).
15.
Justiciability,
CORNELL
LAW
SCH.,
2019)
27,
Feb.
visited
(last
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/justiciability
[https://perma.cc/3PGG-QQ74] (archived Jan. 5, 2020).
16.
Id.
17.

See, e.g., THE POLITICAL ROLE OF LAW COURTS IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 6-

30, 108-28, 199-215 (Jerold L. Waltman et al. eds., 1988) (cataloguing the role of courts
in major modern democracies, including the United States, England, Japan, and others).
Winter, supra note 14, at 1394-95 (describing the evolution of the standing
18.
doctrine over the saunter of American legal history).
See Scalia, supra note 1, at 882-84 (describing standing as part and parcel of
19.
Article III).
See G. Tedeschi & Y.S. Zemach, Codification and Case Law in Israel, in THE
20.
ROLE OF JUDIcIAL DECISION AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS 272-79
(Joseph Dainow ed., 1974) (describing how the Israeli court system began as "one of the
'overseas colonies' of the common law.").

STANDING, STILL?

20201

649

Because of the importance of courts in the adjudication of
controversies and the interdependence of courts and other democratic
institutions, the standing inquiry is wrapped up in more fundamental

questions dealing with the role of courts in a democracy, and questions
about the scope of countermajoritarian authority held by the court.

Disagreements

about

justiciability

between

formalists

and

functionalists are common in the many societies that have considered
the appropriate role for courts in society, and by extension the burden
a presumptive plaintiff must fulfill to access a judicial forum. 2 1

Each of the world's democracies is unique in countless ways; chief
among these differences are varied views on the role of courts in
society. Some conceive of courts as cloistered bodies with limited
discretion to make injured parties whole in accordance with the law. 2 2

Others task courts with policing the boundaries between various
branches

of

government. 2 3 Still

others

think

of courts

as the

countermajoritarian venue for adjudication of grievances suffered by
an unpopular minority at the hands of a tyrannical majority. 24
Furthermore, the way in which a judiciary interacts with society is not
static and is liable to shift based on external political pressures, 25
changes in bench membership,2 6 and through natural evolution of a
society and its legal culture. 2 7
This Note posits that the doctrine of standing, which poses a
barrier to entry to a judicial forum, is restricted and loosened based
upon the health of the democratic process, the era-specific need for a
countermajoritarian institution to uphold the core values of the society

21.
See generally JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Kenneth M.
Holland ed., 1991) (comparing the role of courts in eleven countries).
22.
See, e.g., Hiroshi Itoh, JudicialActivism in Japan, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 189, 195 ("Judicial review and case law
have been firmly established in Japan, but the country is still run by statutory law.")
(emphasis added).
23.
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 881 ("[T]he judicial doctrine of standing is a
crucial and inseparable element of [the principle of separation of powers]."); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 555, 567-69 (1992) (using the requirement of
redressability to emphasize that courts cannot bind agencies with rulings if the agency
itself is not a party).
24.
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (requiring federal
courts to administer local school board integration plans as to ensure equity amongst
African-American and white students and to remedy failure of the political branches to
address long-standing discrimination).
25.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 at 498-99 (2007) (holding that a state
had standing to sue the federal government for 'inaction' for its refusal to regulate car
emissions which had been tied, by science, to global warming, and rising sea levels).
26.
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741,
1743 (1999) (analyzing the Court's reasoning on five standing cases in which the votes
of the justices aligned perfectly with otherwise political affiliations).
27.
Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (granting standing for
taxpayer to sue government for unconstitutional use of taxpayer resources), with Lujan,
504 U.S. at 578 (denying standing to a litigant who claimed injury under congressionally
granted citizen-suit provision).
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as enshrined in superlegislative texts, 28 and the society's need for an
29
As a
institution to "bridge the gap" between law and society.
preliminary inquiry, standing is an outward expression of external
constraints placed on courts by charter texts (constitutions) and
internal constraints imposed by judges wary of overstepping their roles
as apolitical adjudicators. The malleability of the doctrine is a
testament to the flexible role many societies expect their courts to play
in the development of governments through kind-specific exercises of
particular power. Part I contends that broad access to courts, and thus,
relaxed standing limitations, are common at the genesis of young
democratic nations that depend on courts to participate in the
development of a legal culture and framework capable of effectively
representing the majoritarian preferences in a way that reflects
broader social values codified in foundational texts (i.e., constitutions
or their equivalents). Part II will lay out a narrative of the development
of the American doctrine of standing that will reveal that as the
American government system expanded and matured with the

development of the administrative state, the doctrine of standing was
tightened. Part III describes the development of the Israeli judiciary
and the Israeli conception of standing, which is in stark contrast to the
doctrine's relatively restrictive application in the American judicial
system. And Part IV predicts that as the Israeli society and legal
system continue to evolve, at least some aspects of the standing
doctrine will be amended to restrict access to judicial forums.

II. THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF STANDING

The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a standing doctrine
premised on the text of the Constitution which limits the kinds of
0
"[c]ases" and "[c]ontroversies"3 the Supreme Court is empowered to
adjudicate. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, standing acts to
preclude forum access for parties whose attenuated or generalized
3
grievances are better addressed by the political process. 1 Limiting
cases granted access to a court, the argument goes, is not only
commanded by the Constitution but also protects the role of the court

For example, basic laws or constitutions which are viewed as the supreme
28.
law, or the "law above the law" against which all acts of government can be compared to
determine legality.
29.

AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 177 (2006) (describing the

judicial power as a gap-filling authority which can and should mediate between
lawmaking branches and the citizenry).
30.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
31.
See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984) ("[F]ederal courts may
exercise power only in the last resort and as a necessity, and only when adjudication is
consistent with a system of separated powers and the dispute is one traditionally thought
to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.").
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as a branch of government separate from the overtly political branches,
thereby protecting the independent judiciary from charges of
politicization. 3 2 Though Article III of the Constitution does not
explicitly limit access to the judiciary by its text, the Supreme Court
later identified a constitutional limitation on the exercise of judicial
power in Article III.33
In his formative article on the doctrine of standing, then-Judge
Antonin Scalia noted:
There is no case or controversy, the reasoning has gone, when there are no
adverse parties with personal interest in the matter. Surely not a linguistically
inevitable conclusion, but nonetheless an accurate description of the sort of
business courts had traditionally entertained, and hence of the distinctive
34
business to which they were presumably to be limited under the Constitution.

However, not all scholars find the originalist interpretation of the
Constitution sufficient to bind the courts, and instead consider
standing to be a function of stare decisis and constitutional common
law development rather than textual dictates.3 5 Professor Cass
Sunstein notes "[t]he first reference to 'standing' as an Article III
limitation can be found in Stark v. Wickard, decided in 1944."36
Further, Sunstein documents that "injury in fact" did not exist as a
constitutional limit on the discharge of judicial power until Barlow v.

Collins in 1970.37
The role of standing in granting litigants access to American

federal

courts

has

long

been

castigated

as

a

fundamentally

unintelligible doctrine 38 that is easily malleable by members of the
judiciary to advance their ideological agendas. 39 Even after the famous

case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, in which the Supreme Court

32.
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 892 ('"The degree to which the courts become
converted into political forums depends not merely upon what issues they are permitted
to address, but also upon when and at whose instance they are permitted to address
them.").
33.
See infra Part LB.
Scalia, supra note 1, at 882.
34.
35.
Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan-Of Citizen Suits, Injuries,
and Article III, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 163 (1992) ("The relevant question is instead whether
the law- governing statutes, the Constitution, or federal common law-has conferred on
the plaintiffs a cause of action.").
36.
Id. at 169.
37.
Id.
4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at 342 (2d ed. 1983).
38.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Make Sense of Supreme Court Standing
39.
Cases-A Pleafor the Right Kind ofRealism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 105 (2014)
(arguing that the view that Supreme Court Justices manipulate legal doctrine to further
their own political ideologies would not be so prominent if it was baseless); see also Henry
P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1380
(1973) (arguing that the standards of standing have become "confused and trivialized");
see also Winter, supra note 14, at 1372 ("[T]he concept of standing is 'among the most
amorphous in the entire domain of public law."').
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standing test,

academics and lower court judges have expressed confusion about the
disorderly doctrine promoted by the Supreme Court as clear and
settled law.4 0 As the doctrine of standing developed in successive cases,
what emerged was a tangled web of incoherent doctrine whose
41
the
application differs based upon the identity of the parties,
42
and even the statistical
statutory significance of the claim,
probability of an actual injury occurring.4 3 However, notwithstanding
the complexity of the doctrinal scheme, the general consensus remains
that it is comparatively difficult to gain access to a federal judicial
forum for the adjudication of controversies that are borne from
44
anything less than cut-and-dried arm's length interactions.
Standing did not always exist as a tidy three-part doctrine.
Rather, the Supreme Court has constricted and expanded the doctrine
to accommodate era-specific needs of society as to ensure that a venue
exists to adjudicate controversies arising from rights granted by
Congress or administrative regulations. 4 5 The next subpart reviews
several of the distinct eras of American legal history during which the
doctrine of standing was changed, reinterpreted, or amended.
A. Standing in the Nascent Nation from 1788-1921
At the time of the founding, the doctrine of standing had yet to
emerge. 4 6 The inquiry that preceded the exercise of judicial power was
whether Congress or the common law had granted a private right of
action to a particular class of litigants. From the founding until the
1920s, no alternative federal forum existed that could exercise judicial
power. The administrative state during this era had control over only

.

40.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992) (laying out the
three requirements for standing); see also Sunstein, supra note 35, at 166 (lamenting the
Lujan decision as one that further obfuscates the doctrine of standing).
Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine's Dirty Little
41.
Secret, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 169, 170-75 (noting that after Lujan, a party must show that
they personally have a stake in the outcome of the litigation).
See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976) (noting
42.
that as interpreted by the court, a plaintiff must have a significant stake in litigation for
standing to be achieved).
43.
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013) (finding that
speculative harms are not sufficient to meet the Article III standing requirements, and
instead, a plaintiff must show a high probability of a harm occurring in order to access a
federal judicial forum).
44.
See, e.g., id.
45.
See Akhil R. Amar, Law Story, 1025 FAcULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 688, 703
(1989).
See Winter, supra note 14, at 1394-95 ("[T]he English, colonial, and post46.
constitutional practices suggest that the contemporaneous understanding of the "case or
controversy" clause considered as justiciable actions concerning general governmental
unlawfulness, even in the absence of injury to any specific person, and even when

prosecuted by any common citizen with information about the alleged illegality.").
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limited financial regulation and the military apparatus. 4 7 During this
time, courts had an open-door policy for redress of grievances so long
as the law granted an affirmative right for an individual to enter the
court

for a judicial resolution

of a statutory,

common law,

or

constitutional right. 48
To access a court, plaintiffs had to plead a cause of action under
an existing statute created by Congress and the remedy requested had
to be within the power of the court to grant. 49 Inherent in this approach
is a strain of legal positivism that prioritized giving effect to the will of
Congress. From its earliest decision, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the principle that legal wrongs require judicial

remedies. 50 In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court's first chief
justice endorsed a longstanding English common law view of judicial
forum access with an often-quoted segment of dictum that has come to
define that era's view on the doctrine of standing:
It is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is
also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded....
For it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every
51
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.

This opinion recognized the role of courts as the appropriate venue
for adjudicating controversies and reviewed the role played by courts
in safeguarding the rule of law:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the

first duties of government is to afford that protection.... The government of the

47.
See Paul P. van Riper, The American Administrative State: Wilson and the
Founders-An Unorthodox View, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 477, 479 (1983) ("A simple,
hierarchical departmental structure was quickly erected under the president by the first
Congress, which also explicitly gave the president the power of removal, at best only
implied in the Constitution.").
48.
See generally Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative
Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1001 (1997) (discussing the
connection between early American conception of justiciability and the English system
which allowed adjudication of harms so long as the legislature had provided for a right).
49.
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (declining to
exercise original jurisdiction over the claim because the Constitution required such
remedies be sought first at a lower court).
50.
See id. at 163 ('The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainty cease to deserve this high
appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.").
However, it is also important to note that not all legal wrongs necessarily have a judicial
remedy. For example, 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides monetary damages against state and
local officers who violate constitutional rights, and Bivens provides a parallel right
against federal officers, but the requirement imposed by court to prove not only the fact
of a violation, but also proof of fault often precludes even the most deserving plaintiff of
a remedy for the constitutional tort perpetuated against her. See John C. Jefferies, Jr.,
The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1999).
51.
Id.

654

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL-53:645

United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish
52
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.

The Marbury opinion, often cited as the case establishing the

Supreme Court's unique authority to review government action for
compliance with constitutional commands, was also the most
acclaimed early Supreme Court case recognizing the prudential
53
limitations on the exercise of the judicial power.

B. The Gilded Age of Agreement from 1921-1930
Beginning in 1920, the doctrine of standing arose as the justices
interpreted Article III to contain an insinuated limit on the exercise of
judicial power. 54 In a venerated empirical study of the doctrine of
standing throughout American history, Professor Daniel E. Ho and
coauthor Erica L. Ross define the period of 1920-1930 as a time of
judicial unanimity. 55 The authors argue that the unanimity may have
been less ideological and more rooted in a gentlemanly tradition of
judicial deference, which viewed dissenting and concurring opinions as
5 6 Further, the
appropriate only in cases of fundamental disagreement.
authors note that perhaps the agreement between conservative and
progressive justices was rooted in a convergence of interests between
57
progressives and conservatives. Progressives who sought to insulate
administrative action from judicial challenges found common ground
with conservatives concerned with protecting "Lochnerian" interest in
58
precluding judicial review for non--common law interests. Lastly, the
authors argue that practical concerns about managing a rapidly
increasing mandatory workload at the Supreme Court motivated the
agreement to limit judicial access. 59
C. The New Deal to the Modern Era from 1930-1992

If the 1920s set the stage, the 1930s provided the standing
doctrine with its opening salvo-its introduction to the legal world as

Id. at 163-66.
52.
See id. at 174-77 (holding that though withholding the commission was
53.
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court could not grant the requested remedy as a matter
of constitutional and jurisprudential limitation on authority).
Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing
54.
Doctrine?An EmpericalStudy of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV.
591, 634 (2010) (noting that during this period, only eight standing cases were contested,
whereas thirty-five cases that expressly discussed standing were decided unanimously).
See id.
55.
Id. at 635.
56.
57. Id.
Id.
58.
59.
Id. at 637.
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a powerful doctrine that transformed the requirements needed to
access a judicial forum. The sea change of the doctrine of standing
began with the rise of the administrative state in the aftermath of the
Great Depression. 60 From the brink of economic ruin, the modern
American administrative state was birthed as the "fourth branch" of
government in the 1930s. 61 Tasked with administering the rapid

expansion of new rights precipitated by the New Deal's reimagination
of the American government, much of the power granted to the nascent
agencies was wrestled away from the legislative and judicial branches.
James Landis, an icon of early American administrative law, played a
pivotal role in the development of the regulatory state and wrote a book
about his experiences.6 2 In that book, Landis describes the
administrative process and remarks on the inadequacy of the former

functioning of government, and the superiority of administrative
agencies to ensuring effective administration of congressional
mandates.6 3 Landis also recognizes that the New Deal's expansion of

federal government precipitated a change in the way controversies
were adjudicated with the "administrative process" replacing the
judiciary as the primary form of legal implementation. 64
With the rapid rise of the administrative state in New Deal
legislation came an increase in adjudicative venues empowered to hear
cases that would formerly have been resolved in a judicial forum. 65
Federal administration of justice was no longer exclusively within the
domain of Article III courts, Article II agencies could play a role in
hearing cases and controversies, and this expansion lessened the
necessity of access to courts in the first instance. Further, progressive
Supreme Court justices, concerned with waves of facial attacks on New
Deal legislation and regulatory reforms, saw heightened standing as a
means of limiting court access for ideological plaintiffs. 66 Justices
Brandeis and Frankfurter, seeking to "insulate progressive and New
Deal legislation from frequent judicial attack . . . repudiated

constitutional attacks on legislative and administrative action by

60.
See Winter, supranote 14, at 1456 ("The liberals were interested in protecting
the legislative sphere from judicial interference. Their goal was to assure that the state
and federal governments would be free to experiment with progressive legislation.").
61.
See van Riper, supranote 47, at 479-85.
62.

See Louis L. Jaffe, Foreword to JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEsS xxi (1938) (reflecting on Landis' innovation in the academic field of
administrative law).
63.
Id. at 1.
64.
See generally id. (discussing the rise of the administrative state in light of the
separation of powers doctrine).
65.
Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and JudicialNondelegation:An Article III
Canon, 107 Nw. U. L. REv. 1569, 1589-90 (2013) (explaining the birth of adjudicative
agencies as marking a shift in the power dynamic between Article III courts and Article
II agencies, but recognizing that administrative action remained subject to judicial
review).
66.
See Winter, supra note 14, at 1443-45.
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invoking justiciability doctrines." 67 The key doctrine cited by the
progressive justices was a requirement that the plaintiffs have
standing to invoke the judicial power to "invalidate democratic
outcomes." 68
The central argument advanced by proponents of heightened
standing was that the doctrine exists to enforce the structural
limitations of the Constitution. 69 An early precursor to the modern
doctrine of standing was considered in Frothinghamv. Mellon in which
the Supreme Court held:
The party who invokes the [equity] power must be able to show .. . that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . If a
case for preventative relief be presented the court enjoins, in effect, not the
execution of the statute, but the acts of the official ... . Here the parties plaintiff
have no such case. Looking through the forms of words to the substance of their
complaint, it is merely that officials of the executive . . . will execute an act of
Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To
70
do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy.

In this case, the Supreme Court recognized a limit to judicial authority
and refused to find standing for the plaintiff who simply wished to
7
challenge a political determination of a government official. 1 The
Supreme Court, particularly, held that the plaintiffs had not asserted
72
a sufficient injury-in-fact for a court to exercise its power. It was this
case that would later come to be seen as a foundational precedent for
the doctrine of standing in its modern form.
D. The Modern Standing Doctrine
Standing determines whether a particular litigant has access to a
judicial forum as of right. Underlying this inquiry is the question of
whether there is a cognizable legal interest that a court can effectively
vindicate. 73 To make this case, a litigant must plead facts sufficient to
give a judge reason to believe that the harm asserted is actual, is
caused by the defendant, and is capable of judicial resolution. 74 Though
clear in principle, the application of this concept is much more
convoluted, since the questions necessarily implicate the subjective

See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 179-80.
67.
68.
Id. at 180.
69.
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1.
70.
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923).
Id. at 486-89.
71.
72.
Id.
73.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) ("[T]he 'injury in
fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party
seeking review be himself among the injured.").
See id.; see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J.
74.
221, 222-23 (noting that the standing inquiry determines whether the plaintiff has
asserted a cognizable right and is fairly seen as a substantive judicial inquiry).
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views of the judge adjudicating the controversy, and the stringency of
their application of the tripart requirement.
In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt
by a conservation organization to halt development permits because
the group was unable to show a particular harm and instead asserted
vague, general associational interests in environmental protection. 75
The Supreme Court determined that the link between the plaintiffs
and the asserted injury was too attenuated to justify adjudication and
dismissed the case for lack of standing. 76 In Allen v. Wright, the
Supreme Court held that parents of African American children could
not sue the IRS for failing to enforce a policy revoking the tax-exempt

status of schools, which pulled white students away from public schools
at the expense of diversity. 77 The Supreme Court held that the line of
causation between the Internal Revenue Service exemption policy and
the de facto resegregation was too attenuated for judicial resolution
and also was a general grievance better suited for resolution in the
political arena. 78
And in Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, the Supreme Court denied
the plaintiff standing to challenge a provision of the Federal

Intelligence Surveillance Act79 that allowed the attorney general to
obtain foreign intelligence by surveilling foreign targets. In ruling
against the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court held that fear of surveillance
alone did not grant standing for two reasons; first because plaintiffs
fear of surveillance was not certainly impending since surveillance

powers

granted

by Congress

were

enforced

according

to

the

independent judgment of a mediating decisionmaker. 8 0 Second, the

Supreme Court noted that the costly measures taken by the plaintiffs
to avoid surveillance were self-inflicted and were thus not fairly caused

75.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 (1972) (finding no standing
for plaintiffs promoting ideologies without an actual injury).
76. Id. ('The requirement that a party seeking review must allege facts showing
that he is himself adversely affected does not insulate executive action from judicial
review, nor does it prevent any public interests from being protected through the judicial
process. It does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review
will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome. That goal
would be undermined were we to construe the APA to authorize judicial review at the
behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own
value preferences through the judicial process. The principle that the Sierra Club would
have us establish in this case would do just that.").
77.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739-40 (1984).
78.
Id. at 756-57.
79.
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) § 702, 50 U.S.C. §
1881a (2018) (The U.S. Attorney General may surveil foreign persons for up to a year if
jointly agreed upon with the Director of National Intelligence).
80.
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. 398, 418 (2013) ("For the reasons
discussed above, respondents' self-inflicted injuries are not fairly traceable to the
Government's purported activities under § 1881a, and their subjective fear of
surveillance does not give rise to standing.").
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by the defendant. 8 1 The aforementioned cases reflect the difficultly
many plaintiffs have accessing a judicial forum to adjudicate
controversies based on ethereal harms.
The prudential limit to judicial access is imposed by the Supreme
Court itself; this limitation was developed over the centuries as a
recognition that judicial discretion should be exercised carefully and
with due deference to political branches whose determinations
intellectual
The
preference.82
majoritarian
reflect
ostensibly
underpinnings of this restraint can be seen as far back as the
ratification debates.8 3 In Federalist 78, Hamilton argued that it would
be the duty of Article III courts to "declare all acts contrary to the
84
manifest tenor of the Constitution void." This oddly phrased sentence
notably does not say the courts will "declare all acts contrary to the
Constitution void," but rather implies a restraint in that judicial
review will be exercised only when the act of a legislature violates the
clear meaning of the text. 85 These limits on judicial access are selfimposed limitations and are waivable by Congress. 86 Primarily,

standing finds its foundation in limits imposed by the "[c]ases and
[c]ontroversies" clause of Article 111,87 which explicitly limits the
exercise of judicial power to specific cases between parties, or to
particular classes of controversies that are clearly described in the text
of Article III.88 This is often described as the "constitutional limit" to

judicial access.

89

There are two main perspectives regarding the appropriateness of
broadly granting standing for plaintiffs to access judicial forums.
Formalists believe that the text of Article III of the Constitution, paired
with the two other "vesting clauses," restricts access to a judicial forum
to particular plaintiffs asserting particular wrongs, and leaves broad
controversies to the legislative branch. 90 In contradistinction,
functionalists contend that the Constitution places no restriction on
the role of courts in adjudicating generalized harms and that courts
should exercise maximal jurisdiction in deciding the appropriate

Id.
81.
See generally Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for PrudentialStanding, 39 U. MEM.
82.
L. REV. 727 (2009) (outlining the history of the prudential limits of standing).
See, e.g., Hamilton, supranote 9, at 144.
83.
Id. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 179-80.
84.
See Sohn, supra note 82, at 732 (explaining that prudential standing
85.
requirements may be waived by Congress, while Constitutional standing requirements
cannot).
Id. at 751.
86.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
87.
F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L.
88.
REV. 673, 674 (2017).
89.
See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court has found limits on access to
courts based on the Constitution).
See generally Scalia, supranote 1 (describing the formalistic perspective as to
90.
the role of Article III standing in safeguarding the American separation of powers
system).
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outcome in even the most generalized controversies. 91 Constitutional
formalists argue that stringent standing requirements protect the

integrity of the three-branch system by precluding democratically
unaccountable courts from reviewing cases or controversies for which
political branches are better positioned to resolve. 92 Furthermore,

proponents of this theory note that restricting court access to only
those plaintiffs that meet the particular standards of the doctrine
funnels energy into the machinery of democracy, encourages strong
legislative responsiveness, and reserves an independent role for the

judiciary outside of the hot-button political controversy of the day. 93
Those precluded from court access are not up a proverbial creek, but
instead-the theory goes-must advance their interests through the
legislative process in coalition with other similarly situated

nonplaintiffs. 94
Before his appointment to the Supreme Court, then-Judge Scalia
.

argued that construing standing broadly will "inevitably produce ..
an overjudicialization of the process of self-governance." 95 Under this
theory, broad standing would act to position courts, rather than
development of
legislatures, as the preeminent forum for the
appropriate solutions for controversies that impact the general

population. 96 Scalia adds that "the degree to which the courts become
converted into political forums depends not merely upon what issues
they are permitted to address, but also upon when and at whose
instance they are permitted to address them." 9 7 In other words,
standing plays a gatekeeping role in excluding court access to political
controversies and those controversies that invite judges to perform
law-making rather than law-applying function. Scalia feared that
broad standing would inevitably open courts to political quandaries
that would tarnish the independence of the judiciary, and position

91.
See Kent H. Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separationof Powers, 91 IND.
L.J. 665, 674-75 (2016) (comparing the shortcomings of both formalism and
functionalism in light of Constitutional interpretation).
92.
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982) ('The exercise of judicial power, which can so
profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore
restricted to litigants who can show "injury in fact" resulting from the action which they
seek to have the court adjudicate.").
93.
See Scalia, supra note 1; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)
("Like their constitutional counterpart, these judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction are founded in concern about the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society.") (citations omitted).
94. John Harrison, Legislative Power and JudicialPower, 31 CONST. COMMENT.
295, 298-300 (2016) (describing the difference between prospective rule making and
retroactive rule application as the primary distinction between judicial and legislative
authority).
95.
Scalia, supra note 1, at 881.
96. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 891.
97. Id. at 892.
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judges as little more than superlegislative policymakers debating
98
remedies for generalized harms to the general public.

Conversely, proponents of broad access to courts argue that
restrictive standing prevents courts from intervening in situations in
which an injury is widely shared, thereby denying redress for
aggrieved parties who may be marginalized in a majoritarian political
system. 99 In United States v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency
Procedures, this functionalist perspective prevailed, as the Supreme
Court held that "[to] deny standing to persons who are in fact injured
simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the
most injurious and widespread Government actions could be
questioned by nobody." 0 0 Couched in the "injury-in-fact" language
developed by the Supreme Court over many successive standing cases,
the functionalists broadly expanded jurisdiction to adjudicate even
generalized harms.101 Under a broad standing doctrine, courts, as
countermajoritarian institutions, are positioned to address even
tangential or inconsequential harms that otherwise would go
02
unaddressed by the legislature.1

As discussed above, the doctrine of standing has been applied
03
differently during several iterations of American history.1 Each shift
in the doctrine's applicability appears to be designed to match the
political and legal needs of a changing society whose views on the role
04
By the midof courts in society shifted as circumstances changed.1
1990s, the new proponents of restricting court access were often judges
05
concerned with enforcing the formal structure of the Constitution.1
And in 1992, Justice Scalia was chosen by the Supreme Court to write
an opinion that is oft cited as the decision that carved the modern

98.
Id.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968) (Douglas, J. concurring) (noting
99.
that federal courts should serve as adjudicatory bodies rectifying the power differential
between harmed litigants and powerful governments).
100. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
101. Id.
102. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1986) (describing courts as counter-majoritarian

institutions focused on vindicating the rights of minorities and oppressed members of
society).
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 689-90 (2004) (describing the doctrine of standing as a
modern limitation on the cases or controversies granted access to a judicial forum).
105. See C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffery Todd, Where You Stand Depends on Who
Sits: Platform Promises and Judicial Gatekeeping in the FederalCourts, 53 J. POLITICS
175, 178-83 (1991) (finding that Republican appointed justices are more likely to deny
standing to "underdog" plaintiffs).
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standing doctrine into stone with its three tidy requirements:
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(1)

injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.1 06
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court effectively
reworked the rules of standing in American courts and forced a sea
change of standing requirements for access to federal courts.1 07 The
plaintiffs in Lujan brought a citizen suit under the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (ESA), which explicitly granted private citizens a right-of-

action against the government for failure to comply with the mandates
of the legislation.1 0 8 The ESA required the government to ensure that
expenditures of government finances did not pose a threat to the
existence of any endangered species.1 09 The Department of the Interior
initially interpreted the statute to require an assessment of the impact
of international expenditures on endangered species." 0 Later, the
agency rescinded the regulation and precluded consideration of foreign
expenditures under the ESA.1" Plaintiffs sued the government,

claiming that the government's failure to consider international
expenditures would undoubtedly harm endangered species inhabiting
environments that the plaintiffs planned to revisit. 1 ' 2 The Supreme
Court determined that because the plaintiff could not identify a specific
date of return to observe the endangered species, their claim was

void."

3

The Lujan opinion did not nullify the plaintiff's claim based solely
on a glaring lack of a concrete injury." 4 Rather, the Supreme Court
struck down the very statutory vehicle that granted a procedural injury
which purported to allow private litigants to sue for the executive's
failure to enforce laws a certain way. In other words, the opinion struck
down Congress's ability to grant procedural standing to citizens unless
they fulfilled the requirements of Article III. In Justice Scalia's
construction, the concrete injury requirement of the doctrine of
standing contained important separation of powers significance that
disallowed Congress from converting generalized interests into specific
rights inducible in the court." 5 The Supreme Court was concerned that
such carte blanche delegations permit "Congress to transfer from the

106. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); see also Sunstein,
supra note 35, at 164-65 (emphasizing the impact of Justice Scalia's standing
requirements in Lujan).
107. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-63 (describing the requirements of standing in
federal courts).
108. Id. at 557-58.
109. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
110. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555-61 (finding that the FWS and NMFS promulgated
the joint regulation extending § 7(a)(2) to actions abroad, but the Interior Department
later modified that position).
111. See id.
112. Id. at 563-64.
113. Id. at 563-64, 567.
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id. at 559-60.
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President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
Constitutional Duty, to 'take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' 116 The Supreme Court went on to draw a stark distinction
between cases in which a plaintiff has a specific, personal interest in a
case, and those cases in which the "plaintiff's asserted injury arises
from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation of someone
else." 117 In Lujan, the Supreme Court built upon its past decision in
8
Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations v. Camp11 and
clearly defined the factors required to allow a potential litigant access
11 9
to federal court.
At a minimum, a litigant is required to show that their

controversy qualifies for adjudication under the "Case or Controversy"
prong of Article 111.120 To meet this standard, the litigant must have:
(1) suffered an injury, which must have been (2) caused by the
defendant, and it must (3) be within the ability of the court to provide
21
The development of
a solution, commonly known as "redressability."1
the standing doctrine, brought about in the lucid Lujan opinion,
clarified what had yet been left unclear; an injury-in-fact, according to
the Supreme Court, must be something more than simply a legal
right.1 22 A plaintiff must show that they have suffered a tangible
injury.1 23 The general requirements set out in Lujan are augmented by
the Supreme Court's decision in Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission in which the Supreme Court developed a

test to determine

three-part
standing.1

the requirements

of associational

24

An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when (a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested require the participation of
12 5
the individual members of the lawsuit.

116. Id. at 556 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II § 3).
117. Id. at 562-63.
118. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (setting forth a two-part test requiring that plaintiff
seeking access to federal court show "injury in fact" and that the "interest sought to be
protected . . . be . . . within the zone of interest").

119. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-63.
120. Id.
121. Id. (setting forth the requirements of the eponymous Lujan three-part
standing test).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-79 (ruling that a
general taxpayer had not standing to force the CIA to reveal expenditures because such
an injury is generalized).
124. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)
(expounding on the Lujan factors for standing).
125. Id. at 343.
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These

doctrines,

rooted

in Article

663
III

and

in common-law

limitations have limited access to the courts. 126 Now, regulated
industries are given more access to courts than are citizens who claim
generalized harms or express merely ideological concerns. 127 For all of
the clarity provided by the Lujan opinion, the Supreme Court has often
varied in its construction and application of the test to cases before it,
arriving at distinct conclusions depending on the way in which it views
the demands of the various factors on the individual parties before the
Supreme Court. 1 28 For example, in Massachusettsv. EPA, the Supreme
Court determined that the EPA's failure to effectively regulate
greenhouse gases had sufficiently caused a harm to the state of
Massachusetts in the form of lost coastline. 129 Though the harm of lost
coastline was widely shared, the Supreme Court described the special

sovereign status of the state together with measurability of lost
coastline as sufficient injuries to convey standing on the Supreme
Court to adjudicate the controversy.1 3 0
Notwithstanding the aberrations of the doctrine's application,
over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has continued its
saunter in stringently tightening standing requirements, thereby

restricting access to federal judicial forums. 13 1 In United States v.
Richardson, the Supreme Court quoted from a famous standing case
known as Ex parte Levitt to describe the Supreme Court's historic
requirement that a plaintiff assert a sufficiently tangible injury to
access a court:
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct

126. Id.
127. The limits on associational standing preclude an association from merging
the otherwise generalized harms of membership to access a judicial forum. While this
limit seems insurmountable, associations need find only a single representative plaintiff
who fulfills the constitutional standing limits to access the forum.
128. See Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Learn When Conservative
Plaintiffs Lose under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 552-53 (2012)
(observing that conservative causes have traditionally been granted standing more often,
but how that has changed); Compare Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United
for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 488-90 (1982) (taxpayers are without
standing to sue), with Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (a state has
special solicitude to sue on behalf of its citizenry).
129. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 420-23.
130. Id. at 518-20.
131. See, e.g., Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 104, at 689-90 (noting the shift
in stringency with which the modern Supreme Court interprets the constitutional limits
of standing as compared with the period of time between the founding and the modern
era).
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injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public. 132

Implicit in the Ex parte Levitt reasoning is concern for separation of
powers. Before a plaintiff may invoke the constitutional judicial power
thereby putting a coequal branch of government at odds with its peer,
133
Such is the approach of formalists
a sufficient injury must be pled.
required constitutionally in
as
being
standing
who view stringent
34
policy.1
good
addition to being

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISRAELI DOCTRINE OF STANDING

The Supreme Court of Israel is more open to, and, indeed, invites
35
citizen challenges to the legality of official government action.1
Further, the High Court of Justice (HCJ or the High Court) is much
less prone to deference to executive and legislative action than its

American

counterpart.136

Whereas

American

courts

defer

to

reasonable administrative action in accordance with the commands of
the Chevron v. NRDC1 37 case, Israeli courts hold that the construction
of Israeli statutes is uniquely within the realm and responsibility of
the judiciary.1 38 Armed with the sword of tremendous jurisdiction, and
the shield of judicial supremacy, the judiciary in Israel has amassed
unto itself the power to be the ultimate and final arbiter of Israeli
values and the final decider on the legality of any law.
Judicial-and, some would say, political-activism is a natural
39
The predicate court to the Israeli
function of the Israeli judiciary.1

132. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1974) (quoting Ex Parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
133. See generally Scalia, supra note 1, at 882-84 (describing standing as an
important mechanism for enforcing the separation of powers required by the
Constitution).
134. Id.
135. See Ariel L. Bendor, The Israeli Constitutionalism: Between Legal Formalism
and Judicial Activism 1 (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Univ. of
Chicago Center for Comparative Constitutionalism).
136. Id.
137. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(commanding lower courts to defer to agency interpretations of agency promulgating
statutes so long as the interpretation is reasonable).
138. See Menachem Hofnung & Mohammed S. Wattad, The JudicialBranch in
Israel, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON ISRAELI POLITICS AND SOCIETY (2019) (discussing the
Israeli High Court's application of strict formal criteria to review administrative action).
139. See Gary J. Jacobsohn, JudicialActivism in Israel, in JUDICIAL AcTIVISM IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 90 (discussing the High Court's view that
it, and it alone, is empowered to enforce the basic values of the society by reviewing
government action for legality); see also Martin Edelman, The JudicialElite of Israel, 13
INT'L POL. ScI. REV. 235, 238 (1992) ("There can be no doubt that Israeli leaders have
deliberately sought to create a judicial system insulated from an otherwise highly
politicized society.").
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HCJ was established in 1922 in Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-

Council of 1922, which assumed the incompleteness of Israeli statutory
law and expected the judiciary to amend and addend the nascent
state's body of law with judicial inputs from other common law
jurisdictions, including England and the United States.140 This
prospective mandate saddled courts with the responsibility of

contributing to the legal and political development of the reborn state
in the same way one would expect a legislature or executive to
contribute.141 And the expectation that courts create law in parallel
with the legislature undoubtably inflected the evolution of the HCJ
toward its current prominent status at the center of Israeli cultural

and political life.1 4 2
Israeli society has developed a judicial system in which the court
behaves as a powerful adjudicatory body focused on the "realization of
public values," meaning that the court is focused on ensuring that

legislative, executive, and military actions are wise, appropriate, and
reflective of social norms. 143 Being a parliamentary democracy, the
politics of Israeli society encourage vigorous exchange of ideas which
sometimes plays out in spectacular clashes among various small
parties vying for parliamentary relevance.1 44 This historic appreciation

for aggressive democratic engagement is matched by the society's
deeply rooted appreciation for the rule of law. "Without a writtenConstitution, Israelis perceive that the rule of law is the only way to
limit some of the most egregious consequences of highly partisan
politics. And like the rest of the Western world, Israelis see the courts

as the guardians of that value."1

45

The doctrine of standing as a limitation on judicial authority in
Israel is nonexistent.14 6 Israeli society has long demanded strong
judicial review of executive and legislative action to ensure compliance
with Israeli Basic Law.1 47 Justice Elyakim Rubinstein recently noted
that "[o]ver the years, for various reasons including the wish to give
the public better access to the Court in administrative matters, and

140. Tedeschi & Zemach, supra note 20, at 276-77.
141. Id. at 277-81.
142. See id. (describing the role of the Israeli court in determining the basis of the
country's legal system).
143.

See Suzie Navot, The Israeli Supreme Court, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL

REASONING 477-78 (Andras Jakab et al. eds., 2014) (explaining the expansion of issues
the Israeli Supreme Court into what would be considered unjustifiable in other
countries, such as military decisions).
144. See Benjamin Akzin, The Role of Partiesin Israeli Democracy, 17 J. POLITIcS
507, 535-45 (1955).
145. Martin Edelman, The Judicializationof Politics in Israel, 15 INT'L POL. SC.
REV. 178 (1994).
146. See Hofnung & Wattad, supra note 138, at 6 ("[T]he question of standing has
not created an obstacle in bringing constitutional matters for the court's
determination.").
147. Basic Law is the Israeli equivalent of a higher authority-or informal
constitution-to which all other laws must conform.
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also to provide access to Palestinians from the territories administered
the Court has basically abolished the 'standing'
by Israel,
48
requirement."1
The Academic College of Law and Business v. The Minister of
Finance provides an example of a generalized grievance deemed
sufficient for adjudication.1 4 9 In the case, two Israeli law professors
sued the Israeli government, arguing that legislation aimed at
privatizing then public prisons was contrary to Israeli basic law and
50
was therefore a "per se violation of human rights."1 The two plaintiffs
were not prisoners, and the law in question would have posed no harm
to them greater than that suffered by society on the whole, and yet the
15
court permitted the suit to advance. 1 Furthermore, the court
addressed the controversy directly by enjoining the government from
advancing its privatization agenda and forcing the private company to

abandon its efforts. 15 2
Unlike the American judicial system which was created by the
national Constitution, the state of Israel was founded without a formal
constitution.15 3 The Israeli Declaration of Independence, published on

May 15, 1948, established the state of Israel and called on the newly
established representative legislature to draft a constitution "not later
than October 1, 1948."154 October 1 came and went, but the Israeli
Constitution was not drafted. Members of the new society, though, saw
the importance in a "law above the law" and sought to establish the
aspirations of the Declaration of Independence as supreme text against
55
Three of the first
which other government action could be judged.1
ten cases to reach the Israeli Court of Justice asked the court to repeal

148. Posner, infra note 262, at 2413.
149. See generally HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister
of Finance PD 1 (2009) (Isr.).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 76 ("[The] imprisonment of a person in a privately managed prison is
contrary to the basic outlook of Israeli society ... with regard to the responsibility of the
state, which operates through the government, for using organized force against persons
subject to its authority and with regard to the power of imprisonment being one of the
clear sovereign powers that are unique to the state. When the state transfers the power
to imprison someone, with the invasive powers that go with it, to a private corporation
that operates on a profit-making basis, this action - both in practice and on an ethical
and symbolic level - expresses a divestment of a significant part of the state's
responsibility for the fate of the inmates, by exposing them to a violation of their rights
by a private profit-making enterprise.").
153. See GIDEON SAPIR, THE ISRAELI CONSTITUTION 11 (2018) (discussing the order
of events of the founding of Israel; the nation was born with no formalized constitution,
and though the Elected Constituent Assembly was tasked with developing a constitution,
but after several years of debate, no language could be agreed upon, and the
constitutional plan was lost).
154. OFFIcIAL GAZETTE: NUMBER I; Tel Aviv, 5 Iyar 5708 14.5.1948, I.
155. See SAPIR, supra note 153, at 3-5 (reviewing litigation in which plaintiffs
asked the HCJ to strike Knesset action as inconsistent with the Declaration of
Independence).
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several acts of the Constitutional Assembly as inconsistent with the
Declaration of Independence, but the High Court refused. 15 6 In
refusing to give supreme status to the Declaration, the High Court
explained that it rejected "the claim that this document is the
constitution that should be used to test the legitimacy of laws, before
the fundamental constitution, which the Declaration itself speaks of,
has been framed by the Constitutional Assembly." 157

The first act of the elected constitutional assembly was to give
itself status as the supreme governing body which named itself the
"First Knesset."1 58 Though the Knesset debated the possible contents
of a constitution, there was no agreement and thus there was no
constitution. 159 Instead, the Knesset adopted a compromise proposed
by Knesset member Yitzhak Harari.1 6 0 The Harari compromise tabled
the constitutional process and gave breathing room for continued
debate on a possible constitution into the foreseeable future.1 6 1 The
compromise noted:
The First Knesset assigns the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee the
task of preparing a constitution proposal for the country. The constitution will
be made up of chapters so that each one is a separate basic law onto itself. The
chapters will be submitted to the Knesset as the Committee completes its work.
And all the chapters together will be collected into the constitution of the
country.

16 2

This approach gave each side the opportunity to play the long
game with the constitutional structure and to build the necessary
coalitions to achieve a preferred constitutional outcome.1 63 Between
1950 and 1992, the Knesset passed a total of nine basic laws, which at
that point dealt mostly with structural questions,1 64 separation of

156. See, e.g., HCJ 7/48 Al-Karbutali v. Minister of Defense 2 PD 5, 25 (1949) (Isr.).
157. See SAPIR, supra note 153, at 12-13 (citing HCJ 10/1948 Zvi Zeev v. The
Acting District Commissioner of the Urban Ara of Tel Aviv (Yehoshua Gubernik) and
Another 85 PD 1 (1948) (Isr.)) ('The only object of the Declaration was to affirm the fact
of the foundation and establishment of the state for the purpose of its recognition by
international law. It gives expression of the vision of the people and their faith, but it
contains no element of constitutional law that determines the validity of various
ordinances and laws, or their repeal.").
158. The Transition Law, Art. 1 (1949) (Isr.).
159. Samuel Sager, Israel's Dilatory Constitution, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 88, 88-90
(1976) (describing the order of events surrounding Israel's founding and early debates
about a national constitution).
160. See HCJ 7/48 Al-Karbutali v. Minister of Defense 2 PD 5, 25 (1949) (Isr.).
161. Divrei HaKnesset 5 1783 (1950) (Isr.).
162. Id.
163. See Samuel Sager, supra note 159, at 90-91 (describing the discord that
existed in early Knesset debates about the wisdom and utility of a constitution).
164. Basic
Law:
The
Knesset,
1958,
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawTheKnesset.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2019) [https://perma.cc/RC5C-VVVK] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
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166
and the status of Jerusalem.1 6 7
powers,1 65 high government officers,
Most members of the Knesset were unaware that passage of basic laws
would eventually have the consequence of stripping supremacy from
the Knesset and granting the judiciary the unique authority to review
68
government action against the basic laws for conformance.1
The High Court of Justice and lower Israeli courts did not sit idly
by awaiting a constitution to neatly spell out the limits of judicial
authority; rather, the judiciary acted as the arbiter of common law
rights and as the body responsible for applying Knesset law to
controversies.1 69 However, over time, the absence of a formalized
constitution with clear jurisdictional limits left a gap for the judiciary
to rapidly extend its authority to adjudicate controversies outside of
the Basic Law framework.1 70 Eventually, the Basic Law of Israel would
be given constitutional status through a series of decisions of the High
Court of Justice which elevated all of the Basic Law as the supreme

law of the land.
From the founding of the state in 1947, the Israeli judiciary has
experienced rather drastic shifts in its self-perceived role in the society,
and thus in the way it is perceived by other branches of government,
and the citizenry more broadly.171 Israeli Supreme Court Justice

165. Basic
Law:
The
Government,
2001,
httpJ/knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawTheGovernment.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2019) [https://perma.cc/87UT-BVFVJ (archived Nov. 10, 2019) ("Passed initially on
August 13, 1968, by the Sixth Knesset. On March 18, 1992, the 12th Knesset replaced
the law in order to change the electoral system, with the purpose of creating a direct
prime ministerial elections system from the 14th Knesset and onward.").
166. Basic
Law:
The
President
of
the
State,
1964,
httpJ/knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawThePresident.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2019) [https://perma.cc/MZ6R-3YZ8] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
1980,
Israel,
of
Capital
The
Jerusalem
Law:
167. Basic
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawJerusalem.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,2019)
[https-J/perma.cc/H53C-K27Q] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
168. See SAPIR, supra note 153, at 84 ("The age of innocence soon passed, however,
when the Court proclaimed the constitutional revolution and embarked in a flurry of
activity relying on the new Basic Laws as a source of legitimation.").
169. Robert A. Burt, Inventing JudicialReview: Israel and America, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2013, 2020 (1989) ("From the outset, the Israeli judges accepted the basic premise
of legislative supremacy. Even with this acceptance, however, there were two different
judicial responses available: to follow a course of unquestioning deference to legislative
enactments and by extension to the actions of Cabinet ministers directly responsible to
the Knesset; or to offer only grudging acquiescence and to claim a role for independent
judicial scrutiny by narrowly construing legislation and confining ministerial discretion.
During the two decades following independence, the Supreme Court pursued both
alternatives notwithstanding their apparent inconsistency.").
170. CompareEliahu Likhovski, The Courts and the Legislative Supremacy of the
Knesset, 3 ISR. L. REV. 345, 351 (1968) ("The [Israeli] courts will not enforce or adjudicate
on 'political' questions even if they are inherent in the law of Knesset."), with BARAK,
supra note 29, at 177-89 (listing the various political controversies that Israeli courts
regularly adjudicate, including questions of discretion and policy).
171. See Shoshana Netanyahu, The Supreme Court of Israel: A Safeguard of the
Rule of Law, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 2; see also Or Bassok, The Israeli Supreme Court's
Mythical Image - A Death of a Thousand Bites, 23 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REV. 39, 41 (2014)
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Shoshana Netanyahu notes that between the 1970s and the late 1990s,
the view of the High Court in the eyes of the ordinary citizen shifted

from "resolving disputes" to "safeguarding the rule of law." 1 72 This
newfound perspective harkened to the days of nascent Israel when the
government depended on the judiciary to supplement the statutory law

with common law decisions that would, in many cases, form the
baseline for future Knesset actions.1 73
The judiciary's struggle for supreme authority in matters of

review of governmental action came in piecemeal fashion. At the
founding, the Israeli government vested supreme authority in the
Knesset, which would serve as the democratically elected sovereign to
which other branches of government-including the judiciary-would

be subservient.1 7 4 The Knesset's supremacy was evidenced by the fact
that it could "make or unmake" any law without review of any court.1 7 5
By design, the Israeli system of parliamentary supremacy reflected the
English legal system.1 76 The British occupation of Mandatory
Palestine set the foundational principles of Israeli democracy including
that of legislative supremacy and judicial subservience.1 77 However,
the judiciary was not an afterthought;
courts adjudicated
controversies, but initially lacked the authority of judicial review. 178
The Knesset granted courts the authority to order any public official to
"do or refrain from doing any act in the lawful exercise of his
functions."1 79 This legislation also endowed the High Court with
original jurisdiction to review administrative action-both procedural
and substantive-for compliance with the judiciary's notions of
justice.1 80 Though the Judiciary Statute did not empower the judiciary
with supremacy of judicial interpretation, the intonation of the

(discussing the drastic growth in the Court's jurisdiction as a reason for its lessened
legitimacy in Israeli society).
172. See Netanyahu, supra note 171, at 2.
173. See Tedeschi & Zemach, supra note 20.
174. Likhovski, supra note 170, at 347 (discussing the relationship between the
Knesset and the Court and highlighting the tensions based on what the Knesset views
as "jurisdictional usurpation").
175. Id.
176. Burt, supra note 169, at 2015 ("Israeli jurisprudence had an alternative to the
American model for judicial conduct-the British example of judicial deference to
legislative supremacy. At the outset, Israeli judges explicitly relied on this model to
explain their subordinate relation to the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament. Large portions
of Israeli law had been directly carried over from the British Mandatory Authority in
Palestine.").
177. See Eli M. Salzberger, Judicial Activism in Israel 9-11 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Univ. of Haifa, Faculty of Law) (discussing the impact of
the British judiciary on the Israeli judiciary).
178. See Burt, supra note 169, at 2014-15.
179. Basic
Law:
The
Judiciary,
1984,
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawTheJudiciary.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2019) [https://perma.cc/MU6C-ZTL9] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
180.

See Zeev Segal, AdministrativeLaw, in INTRODUcTION TO THE LAw OF ISRAEL

64-65 (Amos Shapira et al. eds., 1995).
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legislation reflected the Knesset's intention to grant tremendous
discretion for judges to compare government actions with broad notions
of justice and such discretion would soon be put to use in codifying the
Basic Law as the supreme law of Israel.181
"The Basic Law: Judiciary" codified a shift in the way in which the
various branches of government interacted. And with no intelligible
limit to judicial authority neatly spelled out, the judiciary quickly
become a forum for the adjudication of controversies that otherwise
escaped political resolution.1 82 Unlike the American system, which
84
limits on standing, the
points to both textual1 8 3 and jurisprudential1
Israeli system has no such textual limitation and thus the only limit to
is the discretion of the judge.1 85 The impact

access to a judicial forum

of the judiciary statute was immediate, and the Knesset's recognition
of judicial authority combined with an increasingly relaxed approach
to standing flung wide the doors of the courts and welcomed almost any
6
controversy as capable of judicial resolution.18 This expansion of
power was a zero-sum game and as the judiciary expanded its role as
an institution capable of adjudicating politicized controversies,
87
executive and legislative authority waned in acquiescence.1
The language of the statute recognized a broad authority in the
judicial system and granted explicit authority for the High Court to
"provide relief in the interest of justice" and to require executive
88
agencies to comply with its interpretation of statutory demands.1 The
limits of the Basic Law permitted the court to grant a remedy in the
form of injunction or specific order, but did not specify the appropriate
deference level, nor the tier of scrutiny the court should use to
89
Statutory silence as
determine the legitimacy of regulatory action.1
to the appropriate mechanisms of judicial procedure simply left room
for the court to gap fill with its best judgment as to what justice
demands. The law further vested courts with remedial power and
allowed judicial discretion to determine the duties of administrative
90
Having been borne out of
actors and to develop substantive rights.1
the expectation of providing a foundation from which the statutory law

181. See Basic Law: The Judiciary, supranote 179.
182. See Shimon Shetreet, The Critical Challenge of Judicial Independence in
Israel, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOcRACY, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
FROM AROUND THE WORLD 233, 235 (Russell et al. eds. 2001).
183. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
184. For example, the American judiciary often dismisses cases if it is thought that
the political branches are better positioned to adjudicate the question at hand.
185. See Netanyahu, supra note 171, at 7 (noting that as viewed by the HCJ
"everything is normatively justiciable").
186. See Shetreet, supra note 182, at 235.
187. See id.
188. See Basic Law: The Judiciary, supra note 179.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., HCJ 840/79 Israeli Contractors and Builders Centre v. Minister of
Housing 34(3) PD 729 (1980) (Isr.).
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could grow and develop, the HCJ immediately stepped into its newly
recognized role and paved a trail of precedent that would eventually
lead to the codification of the Basic Law as the Constitution of Israel. 191
Throughout Israeli history, the HCJ has typically understood its
power to extend beyond statutory mandates. 19 2 The court is permitted
to impose obligations on agencies, and may insinuate protections for
beneficiaries that simply do not exist within the statutory
framework.1 93 Israeli administrative law is therefore as much judicial
construct as it is a statutory framework.1 94 A role for judges as
protectors of democratic values and defenders of overarching
constitutional principles places courts in the position of creating public
rights rather than simply adjudicatingstatutory rights.1 9 5
However, even with the markedly broad provisions discussed
above, the Israeli judiciary's role was limited to particular
controversies between private parties, or between the government and

private parties; the HCJ had not yet designated its own authority as
superior to that of the Knesset.1 96 Before 1992, basic laws were simply
structural laws that dealt with the interrelationship between the
branches of government, and other than procedural restrictions on
government action, had no impact on private parties.1 9 7 However, the

Knesset's passage of basic laws dealing with Human Dignity and
Liberty, and the Freedom of Occupation in 1992, provided the HCJ
98
with an opportunity to reenvision its own authority.1

The passage of these basic law provisions granted substantive
rights to private parties and ultimately opened the door for the
judiciary to seize power, and in so doing to reshape the role of courts in
Israeli society.1 99 In The Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal, a bank challenged

191. See Basic Law: The Judiciary, supra note 179; see also Shetreet, supra note
182, at 235-240.
192. See, e.g., HCJ 840/79 Israeli Contractors and Builders Centre v. Minister of
Housing 34(3) PD 729 (1980) (Isr.).
193. See id; see also Hofnung & Wattad, supra note 138, at 8 ("One of the
significant effects of the 1992 constitutional reform has been the evolution of a
constitutional dialogue whereby the courts can affect future legislation and review
administrative decisions" by comparing the action to fundamental social values.).
194. See Hofnung & Wattad, supra note 138, at 8 (noting that when making
administrative, legislative, or regulatory decisions, Knesset lawmakers, and government
regulators often ask not what is in the best interest of society, but rather "what has the
best chance to survive" exacting judicial scrutiny).
195. See Segal, supra note 180, at 65.
196. See SAPR, supra note 153, 31-48 (describing the timeline of Basic Law
constitutionalization).
197. See
Basic
Laws
of
the
State of
Israel,
THE
KNESSET,
https://knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng mimshalyesod.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2019) [https-/perma.cc/R3ZX-YKCX] (archived Jan. 5, 2020).
198. See
Basic
Law:
Human
Dignity
and
Liberty,
1992,
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawLiberty.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2019)
[https:J/perma.cc/5KD7-36LA] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
199. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4)
PD 221 (1995) (Isr.).
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the validity of Knesset legislation that reduced the debt owed by

kibbutzim and moshavim20 0 as a means of alleviating economic
20 1
The thrust of the
pressure that threatened to dissolve the villages.
bank's challenge rested on a portion of the Basic Law of Human Dignity
and Liberty that guaranteed the right to property and therefore to
debts owed. 2 02 While the HCJ declined to overturn a lower court's
determination, the judges sitting in a nine-member en banc panel
authored a lengthy opinion recognizing the authority of the Knesset to
promulgate the law in controversy and annoncing the authority of
20 3
It was this decision
courts to review legislation against basic laws.
that served as the Israeli edition of Marbury v. Madison and, like its
American inspiration, it created the theoretical framework through
which the HCJ may review acts of the Knesset for constitutionality. 204
Before 1995, the HCJ was limited in its authority to review
205
executive compliance with statutory law, but with limited exception,
the High Court had no power to strike down statutes for lack of
compliance with basic law provisions.2 0 6 However, the newly elevated
basic laws provided a comparative by which other laws could be judged.
Critics of the Mizrahi Bank decision argued that constitutionalizing
the Basic Law and allowing the judiciary to review statutes for
conformity would lead to an activist court that would undoubtedly
strike down any statute that failed to conform with the subjective
20 7
Many argued that
preferences of the judge overseeing the litigation.
only the Knesset had the authority to endow the judiciary with the
power of judicial review. 20 8 Others expressed concern that such broadbased, standard-less jurisdiction for courts would undoubtedly
politicize them and undermine their legitimacy as independent

200. Kibbutzim and moshavim are traditional communal villages built around
agrarian microeconomies.

201. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD
221 (1995) (Isr.).
202. Id. at 2.
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 3-4.
205. See HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance 23(1) PD 693, 697 (1969) (Isr.);
see also Rivka Weill, Juxtaposing Constitution-Makingand ConstitutionalInfringement
Mechanisms in Israel and Canada: On the InterplayBet ween Common Law Override and
Sunset Override, 49 ISR. L. REV. 103, 107 (2016) (citing HCJ 148/73 Prof. Kniel v.
Minister of Justice 27(1) PD 794 (1973) (Isr.)). The Supreme Court intervened only when
legislation violated the requirements of Section 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset which
required equality in Knesset elections. Before 1992, the Supreme Court struck only two
law cases based on procedural, rather than substantive injury due to the laws being
passed through Knesset without requisite majorities.
206. See Posner, infra note 262, at 2421-22.
207. Rivka Weill, Hybrid Constitutionalism:The Israeli Case for JudicialReview
and Why We Should Care, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 349, 350-51 (discussing the
"vehement debate" in Israel sparked by the Mizrahi Bank decision which empowered
courts to review legislation against Basic Law dictates).
208. See generally SAPIR, supra note 153, at 54-58 (discussing the controversy of
the Mizrahi Bank decision in political circles).
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arbiters.2 09 On this point, however, critics' doomsday predictions have
not come to pass, as the Knesset has passed many pieces of legislation
with the HCJ striking only fifteen for failure to comport with basic law
requirements as of 2016.210
However, broad judicial authority to review statutes for
compliance with the basic law or to adjudicate any flavor of controversy
depends on a doctrine that allows access to the forum in the first

place. 2 11 The scope of judicial power is, of course, not dictated solely by,
or even primarily by, its authority to strike statutes or to serve as a
check on administrative action. 2 12 Instead, judicial power is premised

on the doctrine of standing that determines who is allowed access to
the forum and under what circumstances. 2 13 Meeting this triggering
threshold thus provides judges with an opportunity to comment on and
review administrative action or enacted legislation against judicially

determined standards. As the Israeli society's perspective on the
appropriate

role

of courts

has

expanded

to include

review

of

government acts for consistency with fundamental social values, so too
has the doctrine of standing been relaxed to permit forum entry for
plaintiffs alleging even the most speculative of harms. 214 This
broadened scope of judicial power opened the doors of the courthouse
and has provided a window for the adjudication of all manner of
controversy with no injury-in-fact requirement. 215
Though the source of all laws governing the operation of the Israeli
judiciary is found in the "Basic Law: Judiciary," the statutory language

does not set a clear limit on the exercise of the judicial authority, nor
did it define the appropriate standard by which to adjudge whether a
case is ripe for adjudication. 2 16 Rather, the language is broadly drafted
and allows courts to provide relief to parties aggrieved by public
actors. 2 17 The rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction did not occur
all at once, but rather were created over time in the slow saunter of

209. See generally Netanyahu, supra note 171, at 8 (broadly recognizing the
affirmative steps taken by the Court to prevent politicization of the court when
adjudicating controversies that affect political actors).
210.

SHIMON SHETREET

& WALTER HOMOLKA, JEWISH

AND ISRAELI LAW-AN

INTRODUCTION 198 (2017).
211. See Posner, infra note 262, at 2413 ("Over the years, for various reasons,
including the wish to give the public better access to the Court in administrative matters,
and also to provide access to Palestinians from the territories administered by Israel, the
Court has basically abolished the 'standing' requirement.").
212. See, e.g., id.
213. Id.
214. See BARAK, supra note 29, at 190-91 ("Liberal rules of standing have also
allowed judicial review of claims challenging the legality of civil servants' behavior even
where no individual interest were harmed.").

215.
216.
217.

Id.
See Basic Law: The Judiciary, supra note 179.
Id.
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218
By the early 1990s, the High
common law doctrinal development.
Court had an established view of standing that allowed litigants to
2 19
asking for
bring cases arguing against governmental corruption,
review of government action that purported to intrude on fundamental
221
rights 2 20 or governmental failures to appropriately enforce laws.
The case most often cited by scholars as the pivotal case that
transformed the doctrine of standing in Israeli courts is Ressler v.
Minister of Defence.22 2 In Ressler, an attorney and officer in the IDF
military reserve sued the Minister of Defence for permitting deferment
223
students. 224 The granting of
from military service to Yeshiva
deferment for young seminarians had been allowed in various rounds
of Knesset legislation since the founding of the state and was a common
topic of debate regarding the appropriateness of special treatment for
22 5
Though similar controversies on the
certain religious communities.
legitimacy of the religious exemption to the draft had been dismissed
thrice in 1970, 1979, and 1982 for lack of standing, in 1986, Ressler
advanced one final complaint against the Minister of Defense and was
226
Though Ressler lost
granted standing to bring his complaint to bar.
on the merits, the fact that his complaint was permitted access to the
High Court demarcated a drastic shift in the form and function of the
Israeli judiciary's conception of standing because, in this case, the court
determined that an individual need not specify a concrete injury to gain

entry to a judicial forum. 227
In Ressler, the High Court did not incidentally or accidently
broaden access to the judiciary, but rather it used the case as an
opportunity to announce the willingness of the judicial branch to

218. See BARAK, supra note 29, at 190-96 (recounting the development of the
standing doctrine in the Israeli judiciary).
219. Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence and Accountability in Israel, 33
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 979, 984 (noting that the judges have investigative power to
investigate corruption charges against government bodies and officials).
220. See generally Academic College of Law and Business, supra note 144
(permitting standing to several academics to challenge the privatization of public prisons
as violative of Israeli Basic Law).
221. See generally HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. State of Israel 40(3) PD 505 (1986) (Isr.)
(extending standing to six Knesset Members and a number of academics petitioning the
government to extradite an Israeli citizen to France for a criminal trial).
222. HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense 42(2) PD 441 (1988) (Isr.).
223. Yeshiva is the Hebrew word for a specialized Orthodox Jewish seminary.
224. HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense 42(2) PD 441 (1988) (Isr.).
225. THE LAw LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ISRAEL: SUPREME COURT DECISION
INVALIDATING THE LAW ON HAREDI MILITARY DRAFT POSTPONEMENT 1 (2012) ("The

military draft deferment enjoyed by members of the ultra-Orthodox Haredi community
in Israel has been a controversial issue throughout the history of the State of Israel.
Adopted by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first minister of defense, the draft deferment was
the subject of numerous debates; a 1988 report by the State Comptroller; Israel Defense
Forces (IDF), ministerial, and parliamentary committee hearings; and numerous
decisions by Israel's Supreme Court.").
226. Netanyahu, supranote 171, at 4.
227. HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense 42(2) PD 441, 441-58 (1988) (Isr.).
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adjudicate controversies of all kinds without need for a litigant to show
a particularized or individualized harm or grievance. 22 8 In the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Barak made clear that the High Court's ruling
was posed as a fundamental shift in the role of standing in limiting

access to adjudication:
You cannot formulate the rules of standing if you do not formulate for yourself
an outlook about the nature and role of the rules in public law. In order to
formulate an outlook about the nature and role of the rules of standing, you must
adopt a position on the role of judicial review in the field of public law . . . [In
order to formulate an outlook with regard to the role of judicial review, you must
adopt a position on the judicial role in society and the status of the judiciary
among the other branches of the state. A judge whose judicial philosophy is based
merely on the view that the role of the judge is to decide a dispute between
persons with existing rights is very different from a judge whose judicial
philosophy is enshrined in the recognition that his role is to create rights and
enforce the rule of law. 229

After Ressler, the determination of the appropriateness of judicial
resolution of a controversy depends not on any limiting statute or basic
law doctrine, but rather flows solely from the discretionary

determinations of the justices who decide whether they view a
controversy as sufficiently important to merit adjudication. 230 A simple
way of viewing the way in which justices have wielded this discretion
is described by Shimon Shetreet, a preeminent Israeli legal historian

and scholar:
The court formulated a more liberal approach based on a pragmatic balancing
between two competing considerations: the importance of recognizing public
petitions as safeguards for the rule of law and fear of overburdening the court

with petitions. The court held that a proper balance between these two
considerations would be struck by granting standing to a petitioner who was able
to point to an issue of special public importance, or to a seemingly serious fault
in the action of the authorities, or to the fact that the act in dispute is of special
2 31
constitutional importance.

IV. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE AND PREDICTIONS AHEAD

In many ways, the Israeli judiciary's conception of "standing" is
reminiscent of the doctrine's place in American courts between the
time of the founding and the first major shifts, which occurred 133
years later.2 32 During that juncture, American judges asked not

228. Id.
229. Id. at 458.
230. See Netanyahu, supra note 171, at 8 (noting that even though the High Court
has tremendous discretion to accept any and all cases, the Court often dismisses cases
on jurisprudential grounds to avoid adjudicating cases on "subjective grounds").
231. See SHETREET & HOMOLKA, supra note 210, at 193.

232.

See supraPart I.C.
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whether there was a sufficient injury and causation, but, rather, they
simply asked whether the Constitution, Congress, or the common law
had created a right and whether the court could grant the remedy
sought. Similarly, the Israeli judiciary allows judges tremendous
discretion to adjudicate controversies so long as the complaints of the
parties are rooted in a statutory or basic law right that has been
infringed by the government or other defendants. It is thus worth
inquiring into the similarities and differences between the immediate
post-founding American government, and the government of the young
Jewish state. And because of the role standing plays in accessing a
judicial remedy to a perceived harm, the doctrine of standing poses
fundamental questions about the role of the judiciary in society and the
233
appropriate mechanisms for the exercise of that role.
A credible judiciary serves as an important institution in
safeguarding the long-term viability of a legal system through
enforcement of legal norms codified in foundational legal documents.
Fundamentally, a court in a democracy is called upon to enforce
structural limitations on the exercise of power, thereby ostensibly
reflecting the culture and values of the citizenry. "Given the primacy
of judicial review in most new regimes, courts are well positioned to
ensure that other governmental actors are subject to the constraints of
law. 234 Courts can also serve as a check on the exercise of coercive
governmental power on individual citizens, or on institutions of the
society. "An effective judiciary can protect and enable these processes
of vertical accountability by ensuring governmental respect for the
235
individual rights that underlie them."
Nascent democracies may not have the luxury of dependence on
adjudicate
to effectively
executives
unitary
or
legislatures
controversies in the best interest of the new national order. Too many
disparate interests tug the juvenile state in idiosyncratic ways, and the
judicial body must be charged with setting down authoritative
determinations of law and to act as a cushion between overarching
societal values and momentary popular passions that may seek to
override earlier decided constitutional norms. This tension is often
discussed in the literature as the "countermajoritarian difficulty,"
which views the role of a Supreme Court as exercising control against
the prevailing political majority in the interest of safeguarding
minority protections codified in a constitution. 236

233. If one is unable to get access to the judicial power, there will be no procedure
for a sought remedy outside of the political process, or in drastic situations, revolution.
Thus standing, which precedes judicial access is fundamental to the understanding of
the appropriate role of a court in a society.
234. Johanna Kalb, The Judicial Role in New Democracies:A StrategicAccount of
ComparativeCitation, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 423, 431 (2013).
235. Id.
236. BICKEL, supra note 102, at 17.

2020]

STANDING, STILL?

677

The Article III judiciary was created against the backdrop of
powerful state judicial systems which had general jurisdiction over all
manner of controversy-including federal rights.23 7 The Constitution
created only a Supreme Court; the establishment of lower federal
courts was left to Congress as a matter of discretion. 2 38 State
governments, wary of a powerful federalist system, ensured the lower
federal courts were simply optional and wished to retain primacy over
judicial affairs in state supreme courts. 239 The federal judiciary (i.e.,
the Supreme Court) was envisioned as the institution tasked with

managing intrastate conflicts, conflicts involving foreign dignitaries,
and those implicating rights "arising under" the federal law, including
the U.S. Constitution. 240 In other words, between federal and state
courts, a judicial remedy was never far out of reach for an aggrieved
party. 241
It was against this backdrop that Article III was drafted with the

"[c]ases" or "[c]ontroversies" limitation on the federal judiciary's
jurisdiction. 24 2 Though, as noted in Part I, at the time of the founding,
the doctrine of standing posed no meaningful limit, and the language
of Article III would in a later era come to serve as a limit on the exercise
of judicial power. 24 3 At this phase of American legal history, the
judicial power was thought to extend to any pleading implicating rights
created by Congress.2 44 "Law was that body of rules that defined the
rights of citizens and, concurrently and coextensively, provided a
remedy to an injured party." 24 5 The Supreme Court did not consider
whether the Constitution barred entry to a judicial forum, but instead
it asked whether a matter fit within an existing cause of action. By the
time of the New Deal, the American government structure had been
remade, and with the rise of the administrative state also came the
246
doctrine of standing.

237. See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 145 (discussing the role the Federalists
imagined American federal courts to play in the broader governmental scheme).
238. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
239. Felix Frankfurter, Distributionof JudicialPower Between United States and
State Courts, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 499, 503 (1928).
240. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
241. See Frankfurter, supranote 239, at 503 ("A division of judicial labor among
different courts, particularly between a dual system of federal and state courts, is
especially subject to the shifting needs of time and circumstance.").
242. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
243. See supra Part I.
244. See Winter, supra note 14, at 1395 (citing Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. 738, 819 (1824)) ("[Judicial] power is capable of acting only when the
subjectis submitted to it, by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.
It then becomes a case.").
245. See id.
246. Id. at 1374 ("[T]he modern doctrine of standing is a distinctly twentieth
century product that was fashioned out of other doctrinal materials largely through the

conscious efforts of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter.").
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This prominent theory known as "insulation" argues that Justices
Brandeis and Frankfurter sought to limit the kinds of cases capable of
judicial resolution as a means of insulating the New Deal regulatory
programs from industry challenges that would seek to stifle
administrative agency action as violative of substantive due process
rights. 247 Standing, the argument goes, would limit the forms of action
acceptable to courts and would give breathing room for the New Deal's
reinvention of American government. Standing was thus a "calculated
effort"24 8 by liberals to "assure that the state and federal governments
249
Some
would be free to experiment with progressive legislation."
argue that this was a moment of great judicial restraint while others
250
see it as unrestrained judicial activism.
The rise of the standing doctrine occurred in a period of social
transition and in reaction to the successful implementation of the New
Deal agenda. 25 1 In other words, the doctrine emerged not only as a

progressive

resistance

to the ill-founded

effects

of Lochner-era

regulation but also as recognition that the generalist courts ought defer
to the expert determinations of agency regulators on issues relating to
the national economy. 25 2 In the New Deal era, the courts prioritized
continuity of President Roosevelt's aggressive reimagination of the
American government system as preeminent and developed a fairly
stringent standing precursor to access of a federal forum.
The New Deal regulatory agencies served both quasi-legislative
functions in regulating the economy and were also empowered by
Congress to adjudicate controversies falling within their regulatory
domain. The New Deal brought about an era of regulatory adjudication
authority that diminished the need for Article III judicial forums to
rights. 25 3 Justices
mandated
many congressionally
vindicate
Frankfurter and Brandeis viewed the equitable relief provided in the
administrative adjudicative venue to be sufficient to vindicate newly
created rights, which thereby vitiated the need for a party to access an
Article III court. Furthermore, the "insulation period" occurred with a

backstop of powerful state courts whose doors were not restricted by
the heightened federal standards, meaning that closing the federal
courts to some controversies did not necessarily cut the parties off from
process in a purely judicial forum.
From its founding in 1948, Israeli society has endured tremendous
trauma, war, and terror, but its legal framework and judicial system
have not been subject to dramatic transformation. Unlike the dramatic

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
COLUM. L.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 1455.
Id. at 1456.
See Ho & Ross, supra note 54, at 600.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
REV. 1432, 1436-38 (1988).
Id.
See, e.g., id.
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jurisprudential shifts that occurred in the United States in response to
New Deal legislation, 254 the Israeli judiciary has been transformed in
the common law tradition-case-by-case. The High Court of Justice in
Israel serves as an important check on the momentary passions of the
Knesset and the political branches in ensuring that the actions of the
government comport with the values codified in the basic laws which
have become the quasi-constitution of the country by means of judicial
implementation. 255 The Israeli judiciary operates very much as the
American courts did at the time of the American founding, in that the
standing doctrine poses no meaningful bar to entry. However,
notwithstanding the similarities between the early American judiciary
and that of modern-day Israel, it is worth noting several differences
between the two systems to clarify the contrast.
As noted above, judicial activism in the Israeli judiciary is

fundamental to the history and nature of the courts and to their selfperceived, society-endorsed role as enforcer of minority rights and
check on momentary political passions. The notion that the HCJ exists
as an institution dedicated to the discovery of "public values"
recognizes the potential shortcomings of Knesset determinations and
removes from the realm of public legislative control issues of special
sensitivity, namely broad social values 256 and issues around human
rights.257
The HCJ's self-perceived role as the protector of social values
undermines the doctrine of standing and permits court access to any
member of society pleading any social harm. The HCJ has effectively
adopted a rule that when an individualized harm is asserted, the
aggrieved has standing to sue, and when there is a major violation of a
right, any citizen has standing to sue. 25 8 It is the view of Chief Justice

Aharon Barak that "[c]losing the doors of the court to a petitioner with
no injury in fact who warns of a public body's unlawful action means
giving that public body a free hand to act without fear of judicial

254. See supra Part III.
255. Id.
256. As compared with religious values; the religious parties in Israel hold outside
influence based on their alliance with the conservative secular parties namely the Likud
party. See Chemi Shalev, By EmasculatingHigh Court, Religious Minority Exposes Itself
to
Tyranny
of Israel's Secular Majority, HAARETZ
(May
8,
2018),
https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/. premium-in-weak-high-court-israel-s-religiousexposed-to- secular-majority-1.6071406?v=100E3DA34A3B 1274E269B0D7BBC5A17E
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019) [https:/perma.cc/S5SD-HBTW] (archived Nov. 10, 2019)
("Their ability to preserve the status quo and to further entrench religious influence over
the country is a function of the decisive influence wielded by their representatives in the
Knesset and the governing coalition.").
257. See
The
Question
of
Palestine,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/unispal/human-rights-council-resolutions/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2019) [https://perma.cc/YX7H-3TTR] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (listing the human rights
council resolutions condemning Israel for alleged human rights violations).
258. See BARAK, supranote 29, at 193 ("[W]hen the claim alleges a major violation
of the rule of law ... every person in Israel has legal standing to sue.").
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review." 259 Inherent in Chief Justice Barak's view on the role of courts
is the view expressed by Chief Justice Marshall that "every right, when
withheld, must have a remedy. 2 6 0 And in the Israeli conception, in
order to deliver a remedy, the High Court must be open to any and all
challenges, regardless of whether the challenger is personally

affected. 26 1
Judge Richard Posner, a luminary Seventh Circuit judge,
persuasively argues that the role of the judiciary envisioned by Chief
Justice Barak elevates (or denigrates) judges into "enlightened
despots" accountable to no one and nothing other than their own
26 2
Judge
consciences and conceptions of that which justice demands.
commented
philosopher,
judicial
conservative
a
famed
Bork,
Robert
2 63
that Barak's view "establishes a world record for judicial hubris."
Underlying these critiques are normative views on the appropriate role
264
The American view
for judges and courts in democratic societies.
prefers judicial modesty and judges who defer to political branches on
most matters-meaning that standing is constricted to permit only the
26 5
most concrete of harms into the forum.
Overlooked in these critiques of the notably powerful and activist
Israeli judiciary are three significant distinctions of the Israeli system
compared with its American counterpart. First, the Israeli court
system has no bifurcation of the judicial power like the United States.
In the United States, judicial authority is split between state and
federal courts, and a lack of standing in a federal forum is not an
266
Thus, while
automatic disqualifier of access to a local judicial forum.
and
constitutional
various
by
are
restrained
American federal courts
are
not
states
power,
of
judicial
on
exercise
jurisprudential limitations
by
state
only
limited
are
but
constraints
subject to the same
constitutions, and potential jurisdictional qualifiers in federal
267
statutory or constitutional rights.
Second, Bork and Posner's pointed critiques listed above
deemphasize the uniqueness of the Israeli national birth story. The
26 8
and unlike the federal
state of Israel predates its Basic Law,
the Constitution, the
by
empowered
was
which
judiciary,
American
Palestine with
pre-state
in
its
work
began
system
court
national
Israeli

259. Id. at 194.
260. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803).
261. See supraPart II.
262. Richard Posner, Enlightened Despot, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 22, 2007),
[https://perma.cc/KF97https://newrepublic.com/article/60919/enlightened-despot
XUQV] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
263. Id.
264. See supraPart I.
265. Id.
266. See generally Frankfurter, supranote 239.
267.

(2002).
268.

See generally LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS

See supra Part II.
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an activist mentality focused on assisting in the creation of the Jewish
state's national legal system.2 6 9 This mentality has never been wrung
out of the system, and between the nation's founding and the
"constitutional revolution" culminating in the constitutionalizing of the
Basic Law, the judiciary has consistently seen its-role as coequal with
the political branches in securing the future for Israeli democracy by
protecting the values underlying the very society. 2 70
Third, the critiques fail to take into account the national security
context that in many ways informs the judiciary's powerful role in

society. Israel has existed in a state of constant conflict since its
founding; conflict (and fear of conflict) with neighbors, and terrorism
from nonstate actors is the backdrop against which the political system
of Israel operates. And the Israeli Knesset and military apparatus have
never flinched in their resolve to secure their future through the use of
military force and the homeland security apparatus. 27 1 In this context
of war and violence, the importance of an independent judiciary

becomes keener still because judges are insulated from the "eye for an
eye politics" that often characterize wartime decision making and they,
and sometimes only they, have the political power to point decision

makers back to "fundamental values" that underlie the nation-state.
Chief Justice Barak commented on the challenge posed by terrorism to
democratic societies this way:
Terrorism creates tension between the essential components of democracy. One

pillar of democracy, the rule of the people through its elected representatives
(formal democracy), may encourage taking all steps effective in fighting
terrorism, even if they are harmful to human rights. The other pillar of
democracy, human rights, may encourage protecting the rights of every
individual, including terrorists, even at the cost of undermining the fight against
terrorism. Struggling with this tension is primarily the task of the legislature
and the executive, which are accountable to the people. But true democratic
accountability cannot be satisfied by the judgement of the people alone. The
legislature must also justify its decisions to judges, who are responsible for
protecting democracy and the constitution. We the judges in modern democracies

269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Israel Defense Forces, The State: Israel Defense Forces, ISR. MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/pages/the%20state%20israel%20defense%20forces%20-idf-.aspx
(last
visited
Nov.
10,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/BWT8-KPR9] (archived Jan. 5, 2020) ("To ensure its success, the IDF's
doctrine at the strategic level is defensive, while its tactics are offensive. Given the
country's lack of territorial depth, the IDF must take the initiative when deemed
necessary and, if attacked, quickly transfer the battleground to the enemy's land.
Though it has always been outnumbered by its enemies, the IDF maintains a qualitative
advantage by deploying advanced weapons systems, many of which are developed and
manufactured in Israel for its specific needs. The IDF's main resource, however, is the
high caliber of its soldiers.").
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are responsible for protecting democracy both from terrorism and from the
2 72
means the state wants to use to fight terrorism.

Chief Justice Barak views the role of a judge in society as serving

as an affirmative "permission giving" check on exercise of any
government power. This remarkable quote perhaps describes the
distinctions between the American and Israeli conceptions of the role
of a judiciary more coherently than any of the preceding analysis can.
And inherent to this view is one on the role that standing should play
in minimizing or maximizing access to judicial forums for adjudication
of controversies. The Israeli view on standing distills down to the
following: because courts are coequals in the governing process, the
court doors should be open to all controversies.
But this view put forward by the High Court of Justice has not
come without controversy. Naftali Bennett, leader of the Jewish Home
party, recently introduced legislation to return the Israeli government
to the system that predated the 1992 constitutional revolution. "The
Supreme Court has basically turned itself into the sovereign, the
highest authority on everything. That's not what they're supposed to
do. They're not supposed to govern. We've been elected. They have
not." 273 Even powerful Premier Benjamin Netanyahu has backed
legislation that would remove the High Court's ability to strike
Knesset legislation. 274 Heretofore, the proposals to minimize the
influence of the High Court have failed to garner majority support in
the Knesset. 2 75 But the jurisdiction stripping proposals have found
276
In 2018, the Knesset
many allies in the center right of the Knesset.
committee tasked with reviewing the proposal voted eleven to one to
277
refer the legislation to the full Knesset.
It remains unclear whether the jurisdiction stripping proposals
can garner majority support. But it is clear that the High Court of
Justice is paying attention to the developments and is actively engaged
278
However, should the HCJ
in halting the legislation's advance.

272. See BARAK, supra note 29, at 285 (emphasis added) (internal quotations
omitted).
273. Ranol Wootliff, Checking Supreme Court'spowers,Bennett looks to 'rebalance'
Israeli
Democracy,
TIMES
OF
ISRAEL
(May
31,
2018),
https://www.time sofi srael.com/checking-supreme-courts-po wers-bennett-looks-torebalance-israeli-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/LAR2-HNYL] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
274. Toi Staff, Netanyahu Backs Bill to Remove High Court's Ability to Strike
Down Laws, TIMEs OF ISRAEL (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu[https://perma.ec/J3Q2backs-bill-to-remove-high-courts-ability-to-strike-down-laws/
6FG4] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
275. Id.
276. Shahar Hay, Knessett Committee Approves Override Power Over High Court,
https://www.ynetnews.comlarticles/0,7340,L2018),
6,
(May
NEWS
YNET
5252771,00.html [https://perma.cc/JM69-T3TS] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
277. Id.
278. Id. (discussing the Prime Minister's meeting with Supreme Court Chief
Justice Esther Hayut in which the two discussed the jurisdiction stripping proposals).
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decisions continuously accrue to the detriment of politically powerful

leaders incensed by the High Court's usurpation

of legislative

authority, the proposals will likely gain support and, in tandem,
increase pressure on the HCJ to restrict its authority and necessarily
to tighten the requirements of judicial standing. For an institution that
views its role as an important check on the legislative branches, such
a powerplay will prove untenable and will require the judiciary to
weigh the costs and benefits of compliance with popular demands (i.e.,
self-restriction), which can be accomplished, for example, by restricting

the categories of cases and controversies appropriate for judicial
adjudication through a more stringent application of standing or risk

a wholesale usurpation of jurisdiction by the court.
The Israeli judiciary's broad standing rules allow the judiciary

tremendous leeway to call the political branches into account by
opening the doors of the court to any plaintiff who can point to a
government act that violates a "public value." Thus, as the judiciary
has expanded its jurisdiction over the short time period of Israeli legal
history, the legislative and democratically accountable branches have
diminished in acquiescence. This broad doctrine has been useful in the

development of the Israeli legal system heretofore and has allowed the
judiciary to contribute to the society's evolution and legal development.
But the current stasis of judicial authority at the expense of executive
power may be unsustainable considering the opposition of many
powerful political leaders incensed by the "enlightened despotism" of
the Israeli judiciary. Standing has never been strictly enforced in
Israel, but as the judiciary continues to invite all manner of

controversy for judicial resolution, the political branches take note and
political pressure increases on the Knesset to restrict the jurisdiction
of the courts. To retain its salience, authority, and independence into
the future, the Israeli judiciary ought to learn from its American

counterpart and narrow the rules by which court access is granted.
Heightening the doctrine of standing will promote democratic
accountability and will ensure that the Israeli judiciary continues
standing tall as a living monument to justice and law.
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